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Decline in life satisfaction in old age: longitudinal evidence for
links to distance-to-death
Abstract
Using 12-year longitudinal data from deceased participants of the Berlin Aging Study (N = 414; age
70-103 years, at first occasion; M = 87 years, SD = 8.13), the authors examined whether and how old
and very old individuals exhibit terminal decline in reported life satisfaction at the end of life. Relative
to age-related decline, mortality-related decline (i.e., distance-to-death) accounted for more variance in
interindividual differences in life satisfaction change and revealed steeper average rates of decline, by a
factor of 2. By applying change-point growth models, the authors identified a point, about 4 years before
death, at which decline showed a two-fold increase in steepness relative to the preterminal phase. For
the oldest old (85+ years), a threefold increase was observed. Established mortality predictors, including
sex, comorbidities, dementia, and cognition, accounted for only small portions of interindividual
differences in mortality-related change in life satisfaction. The authors conclude that late-life changes in
subjective well-being are related to mechanisms predicting death and suggest routes for further inquiry.
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In the lifespan and gerontological literatures, it has been pro-
posed that trajectories of psychological change at the end of life
reflect a combination of age-related, mortality-related, and
pathology-related processes (Baltes, 1997; Berg, 1996; Birren &
Cunningham, 1985). The few longitudinal studies in which re-
searchers have examined such proposals have been focused pri-
marily on questions about the existence of terminal decline in
cognitive abilities (i.e., pronounced late-life deterioration as a
function of distance-to-death; see Ba¨ckman & MacDonald, 2006;
Bosworth & Siegler, 2002; Sliwinski, Hofer, Hall, Buschke, &
Lipton, 2003; Small & Ba¨ckman, 1999). In the present study,
longitudinal data is used to compare models of age-related and
death-related change in subjective well-being. This is of interest
because in cross-sectional research age has typically not been
associated with individuals’ reported levels of well-being (e.g.,
Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006), whereas mortality has been
associated with reduced well-being (e.g., Danner, Snowdon, &
Friesen, 2001; Levy, Slade, & Kunkel, 2002; Maier & Smith,
1999). Specifically, using 12-year longitudinal data from deceased
participants of the Berlin Aging Study (BASE: Baltes & Mayer,
1999; N  414; M  87 years and SD  8.13 at initial assessment
Time 1 [T1]), we (a) contrast age-related and mortality-related
trajectories of life satisfaction, a key component of well-being; (b)
examine whether, indicative of terminal decline notions, decline in
life satisfaction is more pronounced in a time interval closer to
death versus further from death, and (c) explore covariates that
may underlie interindividual differences in the observed intraindi-
vidual changes in life satisfaction.
Starting with seminal work in the 1960s and 1970s (Kleemeier,
1962; Palmore & Cleveland, 1976; Riegel & Riegel, 1972; Siegler,
1975), a substantial body of evidence has accumulated showing
that low levels of, or pronounced decline on, cognitive abilities
including perceptual-motor speed, memory, executive functioning,
and crystallized abilities are related to imminent death (Bosworth
& Schaie, 1999; Ghisletta, McArdle, & Lindenberger, 2006; Jo-
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hansson et al., 2004; Rabbitt et al., 2002; Sliwinski et al., 2003;
White & Cunningham, 1988). These findings are robust after
accounting for various physical and medical conditions and appear
to be relatively independent of cause of death (e.g., cerebrovascu-
lar, cardiac, cancer: Anstey, Mack, & von Sanden, 2006; Small,
Fratiglioni, von Strauss, & Ba¨ckman, 2003). A diverse set of
factors has repeatedly been proposed to potentially account for the
noted relationships between cognitive decline and death, ranging
from apolipoprotein E genotype to specific disease mediation,
including neurological problems, preclinical and clinical dementia
and depression, decreased global biological vitality, reduced vita-
min consumption, and fewer cognitively stimulating activities
(Hassing et al., 2002; Hofer et al., 2002; Laukka, MacDonald, &
Ba¨ckman, 2006; Sliwinksi, Hofer, Hall, Buschke, & Lipton, 2003;
Wilson, Beck, Bienias, & Bennett, 2007). Although evidence
suggests that (somewhat independent of age and health status)
proximity to death may have pervasive effects across a range of
measures of cognitive functioning, it is not yet known how many
other domains of psychological functioning exhibit associations
with distance-to-death.
There are several reasons why subjective well-being may be a
candidate for terminal decline. Some researchers argued, for ex-
ample, that death-related decline is particularly pronounced on
measures that are relatively age-insensitive because mortality-
related effects are less obscured by normative age-graded decline
(White & Cunningham, 1988). A large body of research has
suggested that there is a relative, age-graded stability of well-being
across adulthood and old age, despite increased risks for social
losses and declines in physical health (well-being paradox in old
age; Diener et al., 2006; Filipp, 1996; Kunzmann, Little, & Smith,
2000; Larson, 1978; Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). It is conceivable,
however, that approaching death may represent an additional bur-
den, making it increasingly difficult to maintain a sense of well-
being. Another position highlights that well-being may serve as not
only a consequence of but also a source for successful aging
(Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005;
Rowe & Kahn, 1997; Ryff & Singer, 1998). Specifically, despite
a general self-enhancement bias, perceptions of well-being show
reliable interindividual and intraindividual variance, allowing sub-
tle differences to be powerful enough to uniquely predict other
outcomes of successful aging, including changes in perceptual
speed, morbidity, and mortality (Danner et al., 2001; Gerstorf,
Lo¨vde´n, Ro¨cke, Smith, & Lindenberger, 2007; Levy et al., 2002;
Lyyra, To¨rma¨kangas, Read, Rantanen, & Berg, 2006; Maier &
Smith, 1999). For example, Mroczek and Spiro (2005) reported
that men from the Normative Aging Study who died within 1 year
after assessment showed a steeper decline over time in life satis-
faction than did those who did not die. These notions suggest that
mortality-related decline on measures of well-being might be more
pronounced than are normative age gradients and might thereby
provide an important qualification to the stability-despite-loss par-
adox of well-being.
Kleemeier (1962) proposed that terminal decline phenomena
involve two phases of change: A preterminal phase of relative
stability or gradual decline reflecting rather normative age-graded
processes, followed by a terminal phase of pronounced decline
likely indexing normative influences as well as an accumulating
pathological burden. Recently, change-point growth models have
been developed to model multiple phases of change, thereby
providing an opportunity to address such notions empirically
(Cudeck & Klebe, 2002; Hall, Lipton, Sliwinski, & Stewart, 2000;
Wilson et al., 2007; Wilson, Beckett, Bienias, Evans, & Bennett,
2003). For example, Sliwinski et al. (2006) used such a model to
identify a change point around 8 years prior to death when decline
in episodic memory steepened dramatically by a factor of 2 rela-
tive to the preterminal phase. Establishing whether different phases
in mortality-related well-being trajectories could be identified
would similarly constitute an important contribution to the litera-
ture on terminal decline phenomena.
If indicators of well-being show marked mortality-related de-
cline, one open question is whether the effect is merely indicative
of an underlying third variable. Besides typical mortality predic-
tors such as age, sex, and socioeconomic status (SES), one poten-
tial set of factors may be medical conditions (e.g., cerebrovascular
or cardiac diseases) and physical frailty, which are known to
increase mortality risks in old age (Guralnik, 1991). Another
potential factor may be pathological burden encompassing preclin-
ical and clinical dementia (Sliwinski et al., 2003). Specifically,
recent evidence from the cognitive aging literature suggested that
cognitive terminal decline among the very old might largely be
attributable to participants in early phases of dementia (Laukka et
al., 2006; for discussion of the interplay between well-being indi-
cators and dementia, see Nussbaum, 1997). Finally, mortality-
related decline in well-being might essentially reflect the effects of
low levels of cognitive functioning or cognitive decline and
thereby parallel the well-established cognitive terminal decline
(Ba¨ckman & MacDonald, 2006). In the current study, we explored
whether mortality-related changes in life satisfaction remain evi-
dent when statistically controlling for influences known to be
associated with impending death, including age, sex, SES, comor-
bidities, risk for dementia, and intellectual functioning.
In this study, we extended and qualified insights gained from a
long history of theory and research about terminal decline by
asking three questions. First, we asked whether interindividual
differences in intraindividual change in life satisfaction late in life
are best described by chronological age or distance-to-death. To do
so, we applied growth curve (e.g., multilevel) modeling to 12-year
longitudinal data collected from 414 individuals who died subse-
quent to their participation in BASE (i.e., age and distance-to-
death information was available for each measurement occasion).
We evaluated the relative efficiency of age and distance-to-death
time models for representing observed changes in life satisfaction.
Second, we explored whether there is evidence for terminal
decline in life satisfaction, in that the rate of change is greater
closer to death versus further from death. Specifically, we tested
whether a model with two phases of linear decline (one pretermi-
nal phase and one terminal phase) provided a better representation
of the data than a model with a single phase of linear decline over
the entire period studied. Given the scarcity of knowledge about
the exact location of a transition to a terminal phase of decline, we
used empirical tools to test a series of models comparing various
transition points to determine whether there is a time interval
during which the rate of decline increases in steepness.
Third, we examined associations between the observed interin-
dividual differences in life satisfaction changes and well-
established mortality predictors, including life period (third age
versus fourth age), sex, and SES, as well as comorbidities, risk for
dementia, and cognitive functioning. We selected perceptual speed
as a measure of cognitive functioning because it represents a
powerful and psychometrically sound indicator of (mortality-
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related) cognitive decline in old age (Bosworth & Schaie, 1999;
Ghisletta et al., 2006). In follow-up analyses, we investigated the
role of cognitive terminal decline as a time-varying covariate of
life satisfaction changes and the seminal Riegel and Riegel (1972)
hypothesis of diminished decline among very old individuals rel-
ative to old individuals (for a summary of conflicting evidence, see
Ba¨ckman & MacDonald, 2006).
Method
We used six-wave longitudinal data from deceased participants
of the interdisciplinary BASE, collected over 12 years. Detailed
descriptions of the variables assessed and procedures used, as well
as information about the longitudinal samples and design, were
published in Baltes and Mayer (1999), Smith and Delius (2003),
and Smith et al. (2002). A brief overview is given below.
Participants and Procedure
The total cross-sectional BASE sample at T1 (N  516; M 
84.92 years, SD 8.66, range: 70–103 years) was stratified by age
and sex, with 43 men and 43 women in each of six different age
brackets (70–74 years, 75–79 years, 80–84 years, 85–89 years,
90–94 years, and 95 years; born between 1887 and 1922). To
obtain this sample, 1,908 individuals drawn from the Berlin city
registry were approached for participation. Of those, 516 partici-
pants completed a 14-session intensive assessment protocol. Com-
pared with the larger parent sample, the 516-participant sample
was found to be positively selected on a number of variables (e.g.,
younger age, lower 1-year mortality, better physical health and
cognitive functioning, and higher well-being), but the amount of
selection bias was relatively small and did not exceed 0.50 SD
units for any of the variables examined (Lindenberger et al., 1999).
In addition, the 516-participant sample was not restricted in het-
erogeneity and did not exhibit major differences in patterns of
covariation among variables (Baltes & Smith, 1997). Since base-
line assessment, extensive effort has been invested in maintaining
contact with the participants to avoid voluntary dropout. As ex-
pected, given the mean age of the sample at baseline, the primary
reason for attrition was mortality. On average, only 10% of par-
ticipants have voluntarily dropped out at each measurement occa-
sion, primarily because of poor health.
Information about mortality status and date of death for de-
ceased participants has been obtained from the city registry every
6 months since the study commencement. The update used in these
analyses was gathered in June 2005, roughly 15 years after the
initiation of BASE, when of the total T1 sample (N  516), only
83 were still alive. Mortality information was missing for 19
participants who had moved out of the Berlin area. The sample
considered in our analyses was the 414 BASE decedents. Their
average age at death was 91.69 years (SD  7.19; range: 74–106
years). Death occurred an average of 4.84 years (SD 3.27; range:
90 days–15 years) after initial assessment (T1) and 2.10 years
(SD  2.06; range: 5 days–13 years) after the last assessment in
which decedents took part. As is true for any longitudinal inquiry
into old age, the number of individuals assessed decreased as the
study evolved. Specifically, the following numbers of individuals
participated at each measurement occasion: at baseline in 1990–
1993 (T1; N  414), in 1993–1994 (T2; n  267), in 1995–1996
(T3; n  159), in 1997–1998 (T4; n  88), in 2000 (T5; n  31),
and in 2004–2005 (T6; n  2). T2, T3, T4, T5, and T6 took place
1.95 years (SD  0.67), 3.77 years (SD  0.62), 5.51 years (SD 
0.74), 9.00 years (SD  0.84), and 12.37 years (SD  1.59) after
T1, respectively.
To examine the longitudinal selectivity for the measures under
consideration, we used an effect-size metric indicating the degree
to which individuals who survived and participated longitudinally
differed from the 516-participant sample in BASE at T1 (for
details, see Lindenberger, Singer, & Baltes, 2002). For example,
for the 31 deceased participants who provided data for four or
more occasions, the total selectivity amounted to 0.16 SD units
(where SD refers to that of the 516-participant sample) for life
satisfaction,0.80 SD for chronological age, 0.37 SD for SES,
0.00 SD for comorbidities, 0.28 SD for dementia, and 0.63 SD
for perceptual speed. This suggests that higher levels of well-being
at T1, younger age, higher SES, and preserved cognitive function-
ing were associated with subsequently lower mortality and higher
participation rates among survivors. Effects of sample selectivity
were primarily due to mortality (e.g., life satisfaction: 71% of the
total effect of 0.16 SD units) rather than due to dropout for other
reasons. The statistical procedures implemented in this study han-
dle this type of nonrandom attrition (see also Data Preparation and
Analyses), but we acknowledge that participants who provided the
most change (i.e., longitudinal) information represent a positively
selected subset of the initial sample.
Trained research assistants and medical personnel carried out all
testing in individual face-to-face sessions. With the exception of
sessions that involved geriatric medicine, testing took place at the
participant’s place of residence (i.e., private household or institu-
tion). Sessions required an average of 90 min, and when necessary,
sessions were split into shorter units of assessment. Over time, the
same versions of the questionnaires and tests were administered.
Measures
Well-being. As a key aspect of well-being, life satisfaction
was measured on six occasions with a unit-weighted composite of
four items adapted from the Philadelphia Geriatric Center Morale
Scale (Lawton, 1975; see also Liang & Bollen, 1983) and trans-
lated into German. This scale has a specific aging focus and
primarily assesses cognitive–evaluative rather than emotional as-
pects of well-being. For practical reasons, with this older popula-
tion, items were administered in a structured interview format.
Each item was read aloud by the research assistants, and partici-
pants were asked to indicate how well items described them, on a
5-point Likert-scale (1  does not apply to me at all, 5  applies
very well to me). As in previous publications from BASE, we
report measures standardized to a T metric (M  50 and SD  10
at T1), with the total T1 sample (N 516) serving as the reference.
This transformation ensured a common metric across variables
while maintaining the psychometric properties of the scores and
the longitudinal changes in means and variances. Detailed descrip-
tions of the Philadelphia Geriatric Center Morale Scale Life Sat-
isfaction subscale as used in BASE and its measurement properties
can be found in Smith, Fleeson, Geiselmann, Settersten, and Kunz-
mann (1999).
Background variables. To examine how various mortality pre-
dictors were related to interindividual differences in life satisfac-
tion change, we included age, sex, SES, comorbidities, dementia,
and perceptual speed in some of our models. Age was used either
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as a continuous variable (grand mean centered at 87 years) or as a
dichotomized age group variable (0  young old, 70–84 years at
T1, n  165; 1  oldest old, 85 years at T1, n  249). Sex was
coded as follows: 0  men (n  216) and 1  women (n  198).
SES was measured with a unit-weighted composite of (a) equiv-
alent income, defined as the net household income weighted by the
number of people sharing the household; (b) occupational prestige,
based on a standard rating scale for Germany; and (c) years of
education (for details, see Mayer, Maas, & Wagner, 1999). Co-
morbidities were indexed by the number of physician-observed
medical diagnoses of moderate to severe chronic illnesses, includ-
ing cardiovascular (e.g., coronary heart disease, stroke) and met-
abolic diseases (e.g., diabetes mellitus), according to the Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases–9 (World Health Organization,
1992). The diagnoses were determined via clinical examination
and were supported by additional blood and saliva laboratory
assessments (for details, see Steinhagen-Thiessen & Borchelt,
1999). To examine potential biases due to dementia, clinical di-
agnosis of dementia was assessed using a standardized clinical
interview and assessment procedure (for details, see Helmchen et
al., 1999). In follow-up analyses, we also used an indicator of
preclinical dementia over time, as indexed by cohort-specific cut-
offs on the Short Mini-Mental State Examination (SMMSE: Klein
et al., 1985; range: 0–18 points; 70–84 years of age:  12 points;
85 years of age:  11 points), separately at each measurement
occasion (0  nondemented, 1  demented). Independent clinical
diagnoses of dementia in BASE at T1 and T3 indicated sufficient
specificity and sensitivity for these cutoffs (for details, see Ger-
storf, Herlitz, & Smith, 2006). Finally, we included perceptual
speed, as measured by a unit-weighted composite of the total
number of correct responses in the Digit Letter and Identical
Pictures tests (for details, see Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997). The
Digit Letter test closely resembles the Digit Symbol Substitution
test of the WAIS (Wechsler, 1982). For the duration of the test (3
min), a template with nine digit–letter pairings was presented to
the participants. Participants were shown series of digits (six per
page) and were required to name the corresponding letter pair, as
fast as possible. In the Identical Pictures task, a target figure and
five response alternatives were shown on the computer screen
(Macintosh SE/30 equipped with a touch-sensitive screen) and
participants had to touch the correct response figure (which was
identical to the target) as quickly as possible. Up to 32 items were
presented, and testing terminated automatically after 80 s.
Data Preparation and Analysis
To address the research questions of the present study about
intraindividual change in life satisfaction, we examined three sets
of models: (a) age-related versus mortality-related representations
of change, (b) single versus multiple phases of change, and (c)
possible correlates of individual differences in change.
Age-related versus mortality-related representations of change.
In a first step, we fit two separate growth curve (i.e., multilevel)
models of life satisfaction over chronological age and distance-to-
death to determine which time dimension provided a better repre-
sentation of interindividual differences in change over time
(McArdle & Nesselroade, 2003; Singer & Willett, 2003). In the
first model, we used age as the time variable, effectively modeling
interindividual differences in how each individual’s life satisfac-
tion changed from age 70 years to age 100 years. In the second
model, we used distance-to-death as the time variable, modeling
how life satisfaction changed in relation to impending mortality
(i.e., up to 15 years prior to death). Comparing both relative fit and
proportion of within-person variance accounted for by these mod-
els, we determined which time variable provided a better repre-
sentation of the data.
Descriptive statistics for life satisfaction over age and distance-
to-death are provided in Tables 1 and 2. Figure 1 illustrates the
frequencies of observations for the age models in 3-year bins
(Panel A) and for the distance-to-death models in yearly bins
(Panel B). As can be seen in both panels of the figure, the large
majority of the 961 observations available were longitudinal in
nature (i.e., 283, or 68%, of the 414 deceased participants contrib-
uted two or more data points). Each participant contributed differ-
ent longitudinal time segments (Mobservation period  1.99 years,
SD  2.28; range: 0–12 years) to an age gradient spanning more
than 30 years and a distance-to-death gradient of up to 15 years. In
the age models, the information entered was spread relatively
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Life Satisfaction as a Function of Age
(in Years) at Assessment
Age
Number of
observations
Life satisfaction
M SD
70 4 49.61 11.70
71 7 54.00 10.18
72 9 54.99 10.93
73 10 50.93 8.68
74 18 53.59 8.33
75 26 52.74 9.00
76 27 50.25 7.58
77 19 53.00 7.76
78 36 48.18 8.16
79 32 48.15 9.31
80 44 50.64 7.16
81 31 47.85 11.73
82 40 51.20 8.75
83 36 49.22 9.53
84 36 46.46 12.21
85 50 49.27 10.53
86 44 48.79 10.97
87 42 47.55 9.17
88 43 47.10 11.62
89 40 48.08 8.83
90 31 45.87 11.62
91 37 44.62 8.98
92 34 47.79 9.56
93 31 47.45 9.63
94 27 41.40 12.34
95 44 47.54 9.72
96 35 47.89 10.86
97 40 48.68 9.83
98 20 47.18 10.03
99 23 48.56 10.72
100 17 42.06 13.64
101 16 40.09 12.62
102 7 48.76 8.39
103 3 47.96 15.26
104 1 42.44
105 1 35.00
Note. N  414 participants who provided 961 observations. T scores
standardized to cross-sectional Berlin Aging Study sample at Time 1 (N 
516, M  50, SD  10).
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equally across the 3 age decades (70–79 years: n  188; 80–89
years: n  406; 90 years: n  367). In the distance-to-death
models, about 50% of the observations were taken in the last 3
years of life (nobservations  682) suggesting that parameter
estimates are more stable relatively closer to death than further
away from death. The intercorrelation of age and distance-to-death
was of moderate size (r  .45, p  .001) indicating that there is
only partial overlap between the two time dimensions.
Single versus multiple phases of change. Once the time vari-
able was selected, we examined the data for evidence of multiple
phases of decline. In particular, we tested models wherein indi-
vidual trajectories were parameterized either by a single slope
parameter that would characterize individual change over the en-
tire study period or by two slope parameters that might capture a
systematic shift in the prevailing rate of change—either at a
particular age or at a particular distance-to-death. Following pro-
cedures similar to those used in studies of cognitive terminal
change (Sliwinski et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2003, 2007), we
compared the relative fit of a standard growth model (single slope
parameter) with a change-point model (two slope parameters).
More specifically, the first model was parameterized as
lsit  Li  S1i(timeit)  eit, (1)
where the life satisfaction measure for person i at time t, lsit, is a
function of an individual-specific intercept parameter, Li, an
individual-specific slope parameter, S1i, that captures change over
the selected time dimension (age or distance-to-death), and resid-
ual error, eit. Interindividual difference in level, Li, and slope, S1i,
are assumed to be normally distributed around group means, are
correlated with each other, and are uncorrelated with the residual
errors, eit.
The second model introduced multiphase complexity via a sec-
ond slope parameter, S2i, and a change point, k, that identifies
when in time individuals move from one phase of change to
another (e.g., the point in time when the terminal phase begins).
The model was parameterized as
lsit  Li  S1i(timeit)  S2i(timeit)  eit, (2)
if time it  k, then S2i  0, and
if time it  k, then S1i  0
for all t. As before, interindividual differences in the second slope
parameter, S2i, are assumed to be normally distributed around a
group mean, are correlated with the other interindividual parame-
ters, Li and S1i,1 and are uncorrelated with the residual errors, eit.
Of interest was (a) whether there was evidence for multiple
phases of decline (i.e., better overall fit to the data for a change-
point model than for the singe-phase model) and (b) if so, at what
age or distance-to-death does the change point, k, occur?
Exploring interindividual differences in change. In the final
set of analyses, we examined how various time-invariant interin-
dividual difference measures (age, sex, SES, comorbidities, de-
mentia, and perceptual speed) were related to interindividual dif-
ferences in intraindividual change in life satisfaction. More
specifically, time-invariant predictors were included as predictors
of interindividual differences in the level and slope parameters
describing intraindividual change of life satisfaction. Details of the
final model are presented below. In an additional step, we also
explored whether change in life satisfaction relates to change in
preclinical dementia. To do so, we included a time-varying indi-
cator of preclinical dementia in our models and examined the
intercorrelations between change in life satisfaction and change in
preclinical dementia.
Models were fit to the data with SAS (Proc Mixed; Littell,
Miliken, Stoup, & Wolfinger, 1996). Incomplete data were treated
as missing at random (Little & Rubin, 1987). Results are presented
below, in stepwise fashion, with later analyses having been in-
formed by earlier ones.
Results
Comparing Age-Related and Mortality-Related Changes
in Life Satisfaction
To examine age-related and mortality-related changes in life satis-
faction, we proceeded in two steps. As a preliminary check, we
estimated the relative amount of between-persons and within-person
variance by considering models that allowed random effects for only
the intercept (see Mroczek & Spiro, 2003). The intraclass correlation
revealed by these models was .59, suggesting that 59% of the total
variation in life satisfaction was between-persons variance and that
the remainder (41%) was within-person variation. This suggests that
although between-persons differences accounted for the majority of
1 Note that the slope  0 constraint in Equations 2 and 3 were used so
that within person, for any given occasion, only S1i or S2i (or neither, i.e.,
at the intercept) were contributing to the estimated outcome. Both could be
nonzero. We used one of the specifications outlined in Cudeck and Klebe
(2002), but the model is a parallel representation to the spline or piecewise
models given in Singer and Willet (2003) and Bryk and Raudenbush
(1992), except that the intercept term in the model we fit is located at the
change point rather than at t 0, as is the case in some of the other models
mentioned in the texts.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Life Satisfaction as a Function of
Distance-to-Death (in Years)
Distance-to-death
Number of
observations
Life satisfaction
M SD
15 1 51.16
14 5 54.39 9.47
13 9 55.03 5.99
12 14 50.30 6.06
11 14 53.39 6.97
10 25 49.22 11.31
9 33 51.90 7.70
8 45 50.57 8.88
7 65 48.98 8.75
6 68 49.02 10.96
5 89 48.51 9.42
4 120 48.05 11.19
3 129 48.59 9.43
2 148 46.67 10.60
1 140 46.77 10.64
0 56 44.34 11.67
Note. N  414 participants who provided 961 observations. T scores
standardized to cross-sectional Berlin Aging Study sample at Time 1 (N 
516, M  50, SD  10).
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variability, there also was substantial variability within persons over
time. Given this indication that there was indeed intraindividual
variation to model, we proceeded to evaluate whether age or distance-
to-death was the most efficient dimension to model within-person
change in life satisfaction over time. Table 3 summarizes the mean
estimates and variance estimates as well as relative model fit indices
of both age and distance-to-death growth curve models.
Two criteria were used to identify which time dimension pro-
vided a better description of the data: relative overall model fit and
relative proportion of variance explained. In terms of relative
model fit, nonnested model comparisons indicated that the
distance-to-death model (Akaike information criterion [AIC] 
6,854; 2 log likelihood [2LL]  6,842) fitted the data better
than did the counterpart age models (AIC  6,880; –2LL 
6,868). We also examined the explained proportion of within-
person variance (i.e., pseudo R2) captured by each time metric—
alternatively conceptualized as the proportional reduction of pre-
diction error (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Specifically, for each
model, we calculated the change in pseudo R2 that resulted when
either age or distance-to-death was added to the within-person
(Level 1) portion of the model.2 In the age model, the time variable
contributed an additional .077 of explained variance (i.e.,
pseudo-R2) to that portion of variance explained by an intercept-
only model. In contrast, when distance-to-death was used as the
time dimension, the change in pseudo R2 was .168. It was also
noted that the inclusion of both time metrics did not further
increase the explained variance. In sum, on the basis of the relative
overall model fit and proportion of explained variance, it appears
that distance-to-death, as a time dimension on which to track
longitudinal change, provides a more efficient description of
change in life satisfaction in this sample than does chronological
age.
2 Following the general framework outlined by Snijders and Bosker
(1999, pp. 99–105), we calculated the explained proportion of within-
person variance as
pseudo-R2  1  [2 e(u) / 2e(c)],
where 2e(u) is the residual within-person variance obtained from an
unconditional or intercept-only model (for our data  42.71) and 2e(c) is
the parallel term from the conditional model that includes the time variable,
either age or distance-to-death (for our data, 39.44 and 35.53, respectively).
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Figure 1. Frequency of observations (total number) in the Berlin Aging Study in relation to chronological age in
3-year bins (Panel A) and distance-to-death in yearly bins (Panel B). The 414 participants provided 961 observations
in total. Of these observations, the large majority was longitudinal in nature. In the age models, observations were
spread relatively equally across the three age decades (70–79 years: n 188; 80–89 years: n 406; and 90 years:
n  367). In the distance-to-death models, more than 70% of the observations were taken in the last 5 years prior to
death (nobservations  682).
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On average, the age model shows significant but relatively
minor age-associated decline (0.33 T-score units per year). In
contrast, decline in the distance-to-death model was more pro-
nounced: Relative to the age model, decline was steeper by a
factor of 2.3 (– 0.75 T-score units per year). Figure 2 contrasts
the average amount of decline observed over age and distance-
to-death. This figure illustrates the finding that, on average, life
satisfaction remains relatively stable with advancing age (Panel
A) but exhibits considerable decline when viewed in relation to
individuals’ proximity to death (Panel B).
To examine whether the noted mortality-related decline differs by
age group, we introduced a dichotomized age group variable into our
models to compare life satisfaction decline between the young-old
(70–84 years at T1) and the oldest old (85 years at T1). Our
findings indicated that, compared with the age model, the young-old
showed somewhat stronger decline on life satisfaction with approach-
ing death (fixed effects of the slope  – 0.54, SE  0.12; p  .001).
However, the oldest old were found to show an even steeper rate of
decline that was approximately double that of the young-old (fixed
effects of the slope  – 1.12, SE  0.21; p  .001). In contrast, the
age model of life satisfaction did not reveal evidence for more
pronounced decline among the oldest old ( p  .10). In sum, our
analyses suggest steeper decline in life satisfaction during the last
years of life among very old individuals relative to the young-old.
This is contrary to the Riegel and Riegel (1972) hypothesis of dimin-
ished terminal decline in late senescence.
Applying Change-Point Models to Mortality-Related
Decline in Life Satisfaction
Having determined that the distance-to-death time dimension pro-
vides for a better fit to the BASE data, we proceeded to examine
whether and in which circumstances multiple phases of change (i.e.,
preterminal and terminal decline phases) could be incorporated. In
fitting the change-point model described above, we found that the
variance terms, capturing interindividual differences within each
phase of change, became nonsignificant. Thus, we considered various
possible models wherein the variances in either phase were fixed to
zero, eventually settling on a model with no interindividual differ-
ences in the preterminal phase (zero variance in S1i) but with inter-
individual differences in the terminal phase (significant variance in
S2i). Constraining the model in this manner then allowed us to
estimate and fit a set of change-point models in which k, the point of
transition between phases, was successively varied from 10 years to 1
year prior to death by increments of roughly 1-month units (1/10 of
years). Our intent was to identify empirically the optimal location of
the change point, k, as indicated by the model with the best overall fit
(i.e., lowest log-likelihood, see Wilson et al., 2003, 2007). The best
fitting change-point model, under the nonzero variance constraint,
was one wherein the change point was located 4 years prior to death.
Figure 3 shows the model-implied means for the optimal change-
point model, indicating that the rate of decline was twice as steep
during the terminal phase (–1.16 T-score units per year) than during
the preterminal phase (–0.59 T-score units per year; also see Table 4).
Although optimal, this model did not fit significantly better than
models with change points located anywhere in the intervals
ranging from 1.5 years to 6.5 years in distance-to-death. Stated
differently, the standard error of the change-point location only
allowed us to isolate the general time frame during which a
transition to a terminal phase of decline might occur (i.e., 4  2.5
years prior to death). Regardless of the exact location, however, it
is clear that models including change point and two phases of
change fit the data significantly better than a single-phase model
did. For example, a two-phase model with a change point 4 years
prior to death (2LL  6,832) described the structure of intrain-
dividual changes in life satisfaction better than did a single-phase
model covering the complete 15-year period3 (2LL  6,842;
 2LL 10, df 1). Comparisons among similarly structured
age-based models revealed no evidence for a shift to a more
pronounced decline anchored to chronological age4 (e.g., age 85
years as change point:   2LL  1.4).
Exploring Potential Factors Underlying Mortality-Related
Decline in Life Satisfaction
In the final set of analyses, we introduced a variety of time-
invariant covariates in the model and explored their relationships
3 Consistent with our finding of increased steepness of decline prior to
death, a model specifying linear and quadratic change in life satisfaction
over distance-to-death was found to fit our data only very slightly better
(2LL  6,840) than a model with linear change only (2LL  6,842).
However, the two-phase model with a change point 4 years prior to death
still provided better relative model fit than this single-phase model ( 
2LL  8). We also explored quadratic trends over chronological age, but
these were not significantly different from zero (neither with nor without
random effects).
4 This also suggests that age-related change was not considerably dif-
ferent between the first 15 years and the second 15 years of the 30-year age
range, thereby making it less likely that differences in span between
chronological age (30 years) and distance-to-death (15 years) have been a
major factor underlying our results.
Table 3
Growth Models Over Chronological Age and Distance-to-Death
for Life Satisfaction
Effect
Life satisfaction
Age Distance-to-death
Fixed effects estimates
Intercept 49.01 (0.46)*** 45.34 (0.62)***
Slope 0.33 (0.05)*** 0.75 (0.10)***
Random effects estimates
Variance of
intercept
57.63 (6.84)*** 89.48 (11.19)***
Variance of slope 0.05 (0.07) 0.37 (0.24)†
Covariance
intercept, slope
0.58 (0.37) 3.87 (1.46)**
Residual variance 39.44 (2.49)*** 35.53 (2.64)***
Goodness-of-fit indices
AIC 6,880 6,854
2LL 6,868 6,842
Note. N  414 participants who provided 961 observations. T scores
standardized to cross-sectional Berlin Aging Study sample at Time 1 (N 
516, M 50, SD 10). Standard errors are in parentheses. AIC Akaike
information criterion; 2LL  2 log likelihood, relative model fit
statistic.
† p  .068. ** p  .01. *** p  .001.
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Figure 2. Average amount of decline observed over (A) chronological age and (B) distance-to-death. The age
model showed, on average, significant but relatively minor decline (0.33 T-score units per year). Relative to the
age model, decline in the distance-to-death model was steeper by a factor of 2.3 (0.75 T-score units per year).
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with the modeled interindividual differences in terminal-phase
change. The model took the form
lsit  Li  S1 (dtdit)  S2i (dtdit)  eit, (3)
if dtdit  k  4.0, then S2i  0, and
if dtdit  k  4.0, then S1i  0, and where
Li  	L0  	L1 (agei)  	L2 (sexi)  . . .  uLi
S2i  	S20  	S21 (agei)  	S22 (sexi)  . . .  uS2i,
where the life satisfaction measure for person i at time t, lsit, is a
function of an individual specific intercept parameter, Li, a sample
specific slope parameter, S1, that captures change over the
distance-to-death time dimension, dtdi, during the preterminal
phase (when dtdit k), an individual-specific slope parameter, S2i,
that captures change over the distance-to-death time dimension
during the terminal phase (when dtdit  k), and residual error, eit.
The individual specific intercept and terminal phase slope param-
eters, Li and S2i, are then each modeled as linear combinations of
“fixed effect” parameters (	L0 and 	S20, 	L1 and 	S21, . . .), asso-
ciated with (a constant and) various interindividual difference
predictors (e.g., agei, sexi, . . .), and unexplained interindividual
differences (uLi and uS2i). Specifically, age, sex, SES, comorbidi-
ties, dementia status, and perceptual speed were included as pre-
dictors of interindividual differences in level, Li, and in terminal-
phase slope, S2i.
Results of these analyses are presented in Table 4. Inspection
of parameter estimates for the effects of these variables reveals
that of the measures included, only the number of comorbidities
was associated with reports of life satisfaction (fixed effect 
– 0.18, SE  0.08; p  .05). None of the covariates included
was found to account for significant portions of interindividual
differences in terminal-phase decline in life satisfaction.
Follow-Up Analyses
We also carried out a series of follow-up analyses to sub-
stantiate these results. First, rather than using age as a contin-
uous variable, we re-ran the above analysis contrasting young-
old (70 years to 84 years at T1) and oldest old individuals (85
years). Findings indicated that compared with the preterminal
slope on life satisfaction (fixed effects of the slope  – 0.59,
SE  0.14; p  .001), the terminal slope was only marginally
steeper for the young-old (fixed effects of the slope  – 0.68,
SE  0.42; p  .10) but was substantially steeper for the oldest
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Figure 3. Model-implied means for the optimal change-point model (4
years prior to death) over distance-to-death in life satisfaction. The rate of
decline increased from the preterminal phase (0.59 T-score units per
year) to the terminal phase (1.16 T-score units per year) by a factor of 2.
Table 4
Two-Phase Growth Model Over Distance-to-Death for Life
Satisfaction, Change-Point Location at 4 Years Prior to
Death: The Effects of Covariates
Parameter Estimate SE
Fixed effects
Life satisfaction intercept 43.34*** 1.26
Life satisfaction preterminal slope (15-4 years) 0.59*** 0.14
Life satisfaction terminal slope (4-0 years) 1.16** 0.35
Age 0.15 0.12
Sex 1.29 1.69
SES 0.01 0.09
Comorbidities 0.18* 0.08
Dementia 1.17 2.15
Perceptual speed 0.04 0.11
Age 
 Life Satisfaction terminal slope 0.05 0.03
Sex 
 Life Satisfaction terminal slope 0.37 0.49
SES 
 Life Satisfaction terminal slope 0.02 0.02
Comorbidities 
 Life Satisfaction terminal slope 0.03 0.02
Dementia 
 Life Satisfaction terminal slope 0.13 0.68
Perceptual Speed 
 Life Satisfaction terminal slope 0.01 0.03
Random effects
Life satisfaction variance of intercept 111.81*** 17.18
Life satisfaction variance of pre-terminal slope
Life satisfaction variance of terminal slope 4.53** 1.48
Life satisfaction covariance intercept, terminal slope 15.56*** 4.66
Life satisfaction residual variance 31.34*** 2.40
Goodness-of-fit indices
AIC 6,844
2LL 6,806
Note. N  414 participants who provided 961 observations. T scores
standardized to cross-sectional Berlin Aging Study sample at Time 1 (N 
516, M  50, SD  10). Dashes indicate that the life satisfaction variance
around the preterminal slope could not be estimated. SES socioeconomic
status; AIC  Akaike information criterion; 2LL  2 log likelihood,
relative model fit statistics.
*p  .05. **p  .01. ***p  .001.
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old (fixed effects of the slope  – 1.71, SE  0.49; p  .05),
suggesting a threefold increase in the rate of decline between
the preterminal phase and the terminal phase for participants
aged 85 years.
In another set of follow-up analyses, we further explored the
uniqueness of the observed terminal decline in life satisfaction
in comparison with the previously referenced cognitive terminal
decline. For example, if mortality-related decline in life satis-
faction was primarily attributable to pronounced cognitive de-
cline with impending death (e.g., preclinical dementia, percep-
tual speed), we would expect high intercorrelations among
these two distance-to-death slope factors. To address this ques-
tion, first, we included a variable representing cohort-specific
cutoffs on the SMMSE at each occasion as time-varying pre-
dictors in our models. Both preterminal and terminal slopes on
life satisfaction remained significant (fixed effect of the preter-
minal slope  – 0.60, SE  0.14, and fixed effects of the
terminal slope  –1.11, SE  0.38, respectively; ps  .001),
and the covariances of the SMMSE with the intercept and
terminal slope factors were not significantly different from zero
(covariance of the intercept  15.41, SE  14.37, and covari-
ance of the terminal slope  4.65, SE  3.08, respectively;
ps  .10).5 Second, we examined correlated (change-point)
growth models of life satisfaction and perceptual speed an-
chored at 4 years prior to death. Although both variables
showed pronounced terminal decline (perceptual speed: 1.39,
SE  0.20; life satisfaction: –1.03, SE  0.24, ps  .001), slope
intercorrelations were low and were not significantly different
from zero (r  .06, p  .10). Third and finally, we also used
the bivariate latent difference score model of change (McArdle
& Hamagami, 2001) to explore whether mortality-related de-
cline in perceptual speed might precede and predict decline in
life satisfaction. These analyses provided no evidence that
perceptual speed could be regarded as a leading indicator for
terminal decline in life satisfaction. In sum, follow-up analyses
indicated that terminal decline effects in life satisfaction in the
BASE sample appear to be primarily driven by very old indi-
viduals (85 years) and that no evidence was found for a
primacy of cognitive terminal decline over mortality-related
decline in life satisfaction.
Discussion
The major objective of the present study was to explore
mortality associations of changes in aspects of subjective well-
being in old and very old age. In a first step, we empirically
demonstrated that interindividual differences in intraindividual
change in life satisfaction among a subsample of deceased
participants of the BASE were better described by distance-to-
death rather than by distance-from-birth (chronological age).
Indeed, the death-related slope was much steeper than expected
on the basis of age-related models. In a second step, we applied
change-point growth models to mortality-related change in life
satisfaction. These analyses identified a point some 4 years
prior to death after which the rate of decline in life satisfaction
was steeper by a factor of 2 relative to the preterminal phase.
This finding provides empirical evidence that terminal decline
phenomena occur in reports of life satisfaction. In a third step,
we explored how various mortality predictors were related to
late-life changes in life satisfaction. We found that terminal
decline in life satisfaction was most pronounced among the
oldest old (85 years), with a threefold increase in the rate of
terminal decline relative to the rate of preterminal decline. In
contrast, other predictors of mortality, including sex, comor-
bidities, dementia, and intellectual functioning, accounted for
only small portions of interindividual differences in intraindi-
vidual terminal change in life satisfaction.
Comparing Age-Related and Mortality-Related Changes
in Life Satisfaction
Our age-related change model suggested relative stability in the
average level of life satisfaction. This finding is consistent with
previous cross-sectional and longitudinal reports from various
large-scale studies that have suggested that well-being remains
relatively stable throughout adulthood and old age (Diener et al.,
2006; Filipp, 1996; Kunzmann et al., 2000; Larson, 1978; Mroczek
& Kolarz, 1998). In contrast, distance-to-death models of life
satisfaction were better representations of interindividual differ-
ences in longitudinal change in the BASE data and indicated
pronounced average linear decline (approximately double that
found in the age-related model) amounting to three quarters of a
standard deviation over a 10-year period.6 These results add to the
increasing body of literature reporting mortality associations for
level of functioning on numerous psychosocial measures including
personality (Friedman et al., 1995; Swan & Carmelli, 1996; Weiss
& Costa, 2005; Wilson, Mendes de Leon, Bienias, Evans, &
Bennett, 2004), feelings of loneliness (Seeman, 2000), self-
reported health (Idler & Benyamini, 1997), and aspects of well-
being (Danner et al., 2001; Levy et al., 2002; Maier & Smith,
1999). Whereas in previous studies researchers examined the long-
term predictive effects of level of well-being, our results highlight
how change in life satisfaction is structured over distance-to-death
(see also Mroczek & Spiro, 2005)—an essential element of termi-
nal decline phenomena.
Our findings provide important qualifications to the literature on
well-being across adulthood and into old age (for the effects of
major life events on changes in well-being, see Charles, Reynolds,
& Gatz, 2001; Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2003, 2004). At
the end-of-life, it appears that individuals do find it increasingly
difficult to maintain their characteristic level of well-being (Baltes
& Smith, 2003; Diener et al., 2006). The markedly different
trajectories revealed by the age-related and death-related models
indicate that approaching death encompasses progressive pro-
5 In line with this general pattern, follow-up analyses that included other
measures available in the BASE, including initial cognitive functioning
(fluency, episodic memory, and verbal knowledge), social losses (of a
partner, family member or friend in the year preceding the interview, n 
260; no loss, n  256), or balance-gait (for details, see Lindenberger &
Baltes, 1997), yielded the same basic pattern of results; that is, the covari-
ates accounted for hardly any of the individual differences in level or
change of life satisfaction.
6 Follow-up analyses revealed that the age gradient for BASE partici-
pants who had not died by June 2005 (n  83) was nominally shallower
than those who had died (0.28 vs. 0.33 T-score units per year), but this
difference was not statistically significant ( p  .10). This lack of a
significant difference may reflect the fact that some of the not-yet-deceased
participants were relatively close to death and may thus have already
entered their mortality-related change trajectory.
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cesses that may be distinct from normative age-graded processes.
The nominal differences in the rates of decline (–0.42 T-score
units per year) provide a rough quantification of the effects of the
processes that precede death on the well-being decline that are
added to age-related effects (cf. Sliwinski et al., 2006). That the
increased steepness of decline in life satisfaction in the last years
of life was not linked to distance–from-birth (i.e., chronological
age) but rather to distance-to-death further highlights the impor-
tance of explicitly modeling terminal decline. In psychological
studies on old age, however, information about how close partic-
ipants are to their death is often not available. If death-related
processes are indeed present, typical age-related examinations
conducted in the absence of mortality information may thus mis-
represent or mis-specify the change process.
Applying Change-Point Models to Mortality-Related
Decline in Life Satisfaction
In the current study, we took advantage of available city registry
information for date of death and applied a change-point growth
method that enabled us to model multiple phases of change (e.g.,
Hall et al., 2000). Although the size of the standard error around
the change point did not allow for an exact estimate of the location
of the change point, statistically nested model comparisons iso-
lated a time interval between 2 years and 6 years prior to death
during which a transition from a preterminal to a terminal phase of
decline in life satisfaction might occur. The rate of preterminal
decline was already stronger than expected on the basis of the age
models, and this rate of decline was steeper by a factor of 2 in the
terminal phase. Empirical evidence for the existence of multiple
phases in mortality-related change has so far been reported from
measures of cognitive functioning including perceptual speed and
memory (Sliwinski et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2003, 2007). To the
best of our knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate that a
substantially steeper decline in the last years of life extends to
aspects of well-being. The general time interval identified overlaps
with and is roughly consistent with findings from the cognitive
domain. We note, however, that in light of the scarcity of theoret-
ical propositions about the most likely change point, the location of
the transition to an increased steepness of decline has so far been
determined by empirical means only. Thus, it seems that the field
is still in an exploratory mode, and future studies are required to
examine the generalizability of these findings (e.g., with a less
positively selected population-based sample). For example, initial
evidence from the nationally representative German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (see Gerstorf, Ram, Estabrook, Schupp,
Wagner, & Lindenberger, 2007) could replicate and extend the
general pattern of results as found in the BASE.
We acknowledge that any application of change-point models,
similar to other multivariate-structural analyses, is based on some
untested statistical assumptions, including ergodicity (Molenaar,
Huizenga, & Nesselroade, 2003) and sample homogeneity (Bors-
boom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003). For example, our
average results (and those of other studies) are population level
estimates and do not necessarily represent changes occurring
within a given individual. Similarly, in our analysis, the change
point between the preterminal and the terminal phase was specified
as a population parameter with no variance (e.g., fixed effect),
reflecting the strong assumption that the location of the change
point is invariant across individuals. The limited number and
density of longitudinal observations in BASE in relation to
distance-to-death did not allow a determination of change points at
the individual level. In future research, random effect change-point
models should be examined to explore, for example, whether
mortality-related decline on facets of well-being may be charac-
terized by an acute terminal drop for some (groups of) individuals
but a more protracted decline for others (see also Ba¨ckman &
MacDonald, 2006). Taken together, however, our results do pro-
vide further support for the terminal decline hypothesis that im-
minent death in very old age may have pervasive effects across
domains of functioning and do provide a quantitative description
of the onset, extent, and temporal course of terminal decline in life
satisfaction.
Exploring Potential Factors Underlying Mortality-Related
Decline in Life Satisfaction
We explored the role of established mortality predictors (Anstey
et al., 2006; Berkman, 1988; Johansson & Zarit, 1997) to account
for individual differences in mortality-related change in life satis-
faction. Although chronological age, per se, did not account for
terminal decline in life satisfaction, the effect was most pro-
nounced among participants older than age 85 years, with a
threefold increase in the rate of decline from the preterminal to the
terminal phase. Their rate of mortality-related decline was approx-
imately doubled relative to young-old individuals, suggesting that
the additional burden of approaching death appears to be espe-
cially pronounced among the very old. In this regard, our results
are consistent with the view that the oldest old are at the limits of
their adaptive capacity (Baltes & Smith, 2003; Smith & Gerstorf,
2004). The system of self-protective processes associated with the
maintenance of well-being appears to become increasingly vulner-
able. This is also in line with criticisms of the Riegel and Riegel
(1972) hypothesis in the cognitive aging literature (see Ba¨ckman &
MacDonald, 2006), which had originally stated that the effects of
terminal decline may diminish in late senescence due to more
random causes of death.
One scenario in the literature about the possible temporal effects
of the other mortality predictors examined is a sequence of steps
involving an initial decline in, for example, intellectual functioning
(as represented by perceptual speed as the most powerful indicator
of mortality-related cognitive decline), followed by a decline in
subjective well-being and, finally, death (cf. Maier & Smith,
1999). With this scenario in mind, we were somewhat surprised
that (with the exception of age group) none of the factors examined
was associated with individual variation in mortality-related de-
cline on life satisfaction. Additional follow-up analyses also indi-
cated a low intercorrelation between cognitive terminal decline
and terminal decline in life satisfaction, suggesting that these
processes show very little overlap. We acknowledge, however, that
lack of statistical power may have made it difficult to provide
definitive answers regarding cross-domain links. Hertzog, Linden-
berger, Ghisletta, and von Oertzen (2006) demonstrated that even
with large samples (N  500) and six measurement occasions, as
in the present study, statistical power to detect slope correlations
between two variables is moderate to low, unless growth curve
reliability at study onset was above .90. In a similar vein, one
constraint in our multiphase models is that the variance component
in the preterminal decline phase was nonsignificant, thereby pre-
cluding inferences regarding the intercorrelations of decline in the
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preterminal and terminal phase. It would have been instructive to
examine the extent to which individual differences in change
within each phase relate across phases.
Leaving issues of statistical power aside, the present analyses
reveal that terminal decline in life satisfaction cannot completely
be attributed to factors that broadly represent past, cumulative, and
current developmental contexts or conditions that are pathological
in nature, such as moderate to severe chronic illnesses at baseline
assessment and preclinical dementia over time. Furthermore, our
findings are consistent with notions that much of the observed
change in advanced old age is stochastic and reflects the incom-
plete biogenetic architecture of ontogeny (Baltes, 1997; Finch &
Kirkwood, 2000; Thaler, 2002). Johansson et al. (2004), for ex-
ample, reported increased heterogeneity in timing and rates of
mortality-related cognitive decline among genetically identical
twins aged 80 years and older. In this context, we acknowledge
that more in-depth studies are needed to specifically pinpoint
potential sources of inter- and intraindividual variability in the
timing and the onset of mortality associated decline in well-being.
Although research suggests that cognitive decline is relatively
independent of cause of death (e.g., Anstey et al., 2006; Small et
al., 2003), it is conceivable that various causes of death in very old
age (e.g., cerebrovascular, cardiac, frailty, and cancer) and condi-
tions associated with the process of dying may account for differ-
ential portions of individual differences in terminal decline of
well-being. The present data did not allow an examination of these
speculations.
Conceptually, it is an open question as to what underlies the
pronounced deterioration of well-being linked to death and inter-
individual differences therein. To avoid a possible misunderstand-
ing of our findings, it is important to note that we certainly do not
contend that changes in well-being constitute a major source of
mortality. Instead, well-being ratings might represent evaluations
that reflect quite accurate summary perceptions of an individual’s
level of and change in functioning in a variety of domains (Maier
& Smith, 1999) or an individual’s will-to-live (Jopp & Rott, 2006;
Lawton et al., 1999). Increasingly negative life evaluations may
not be directly related to mortality but rather reflect potential
causes from other domains (e.g., health or biological functioning)
that we have not captured in this study. From another perspective,
however, aspects of well-being might be key factors for preserved
functioning in other domains that more directly relate to mortality.
For example, several authors have pointed to the physiological
effects of positive or negative self-perceptions of one’s life and
aging with regard to cardiovascular and immune functioning as
well as recovery after heart attack (Danner et al., 2001; Kiecolt-
Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002; Pressman & Cohen,
2005; Steptoe, Wardle, & Marmot, 2005). Such physiological
effects could also influence the brain and thus have an impact on
subsequent functioning and long-term survival. Similarly, well-
being might relate to mortality by having profound motivational
and behavioral consequences (e.g., engagement and persistence),
which in turn either restrain or help to exploit an individual’s
resources in the long run (Furry & Baltes, 1973; Levy et al., 2002).
Conclusions and Outlook
Our findings, gathered from 414 decedents of the BASE, indi-
cated that an exacerbated rate of decline in the last years of life
may not be specific to intellectual and sensory functioning, but
may also extend to subjective well-being. Whereas the White and
Cunningham (1988) hypothesis of steeper mortality-related de-
cline in relatively age-insensitive measures has been largely re-
futed for cognitive abilities (cf. Ba¨ckman & MacDonald, 2006),
our results suggest that it may apply to other areas of psychological
functioning, especially self-related dimensions. Proximity to death
may bring about not only greater losses than expected in age-
sensitive domains, such as multiple facets of cognitive functioning,
but also substantial decline in domains of functioning, such as a
sense of well-being, that are usually well preserved into old and
advanced old age.
Our findings warrant more in-depth analyses in future studies.
One open question is whether the terminal decline phenomenon
extends to other psychosocial variables. It would be instructive to
examine whether emotion-based measures of well-being, aspects
of personality, self-reported health, or feelings of loneliness, all of
which have been identified as long-term predictors of mortality,
also show distinctively different trajectories of change over age
and distance-to-death in old age. It would also be worthwhile to
examine to what extent terminal decline entails qualitative changes
in structure or cascading effects across domains of functioning
(Birren & Cunningham, 1985; Siegler, 1975). In addition, individ-
ual differences in intraindividual variation in subjective well-being
represent a persistent phenomenon not only across years but across
much shorter time frames as well, such as days and months (e.g.,
Eid & Diener, 1999; Nesselroade & Featherman, 1997; Ro¨cke,
2006). A route worth exploring in future studies would be to
extend the findings of the present article to include an examination
of the role of mortality-related changes over and above age-related
changes in longer term trajectories of short-term variability in
well-being. The increase of losses associated with advanced old
age may bring about not only a steady increase but a sudden
increase in variability in the oldest old, possibly indicating a
terminal decline in the capacity of the psychological system to
sustain equilibrium and regulation (e.g., Eizenman, Nesselroade,
Featherman, & Rowe, 1997; Thaler, 2002). Intensive multivariate
longitudinal assessments of collections of individuals from early-
to-old age to advanced old age are needed to separate and integrate
the operation of age-related, death-related, and pathology-related
mechanisms on changes in the organization of psychological func-
tioning during the last phase of life (Jones & Nesselroade, 1990).
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